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Book Review 
J. Aaron Simmons and Bruce Ellis Benson, The New 
Phenomenology: A Philosophical Introduction (New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2013) 
Drew M. Dalton 
Dominican University 
The   title   of   Simmons   and  Benson’s  The  New  Phenomenology:  A  Philosophical  
Introduction   is   likely   to   cause   confusion.      What   exactly   is   the   new  
phenomenology,   we   might   ask   ourselves?      Is   new   here   a   temporal  
designation?    And,  if  so,  we  may  wonder,  how  new  is  this  new?    Does  this  
new   indicate   what   is   au   courant   in   phenomenology?      Or,   does   it   indicate  
something   else   entirely   –   some   thematic   shift   in   the   phenomenological  
tradition?    As  it  turns  out  the  word  new  here  means  both  of  these  things,  but  
not  in  a  way  a  reader  of  this  journal  might  anticipate.  
Considered   temporally,   one  might   expect   a  philosophical   introduction  
to  “the  new  phenomenology”  to  feature  the  thought  of  such  figures  as  Jean-­‐‑
Luc  Nancy,  Catherine  Malbou,   or   perhaps   even  Philippe  Lacoue-­‐‑Lebarthe.    
None  of  these  thinkers,  however,  are  treated  even  cursorily  by  this  volume.    
Perhaps  then,  one  might  think,  the  new  here  is  used  merely  to  point  to  those  
phenomenological   works   following   the   trajectory   of   the   work   of   Edmund  
Husserl  and  Martin  Heidegger  in  the  20th  century.    Perhaps  new  in  this  case  
simply   means   contemporary,   understood   in   that   broad   way   in   which   it   is  
used   in   our   field   to   indicate   anything   following   Friedrich   Nietzsche   or  
German   Idealism.      Understood   thusly,   we   might   expect   this   volume   to  
provide   a   general   introduction   to   the   work   of   such   thinkers   as   Jean-­‐‑Paul  
Sartre,   Simone   de   Beauvoir,   or   Maurice   Merlau-­‐‑Ponty.      And   yet,   each   of  
these  thinkers  is  treated  only  in  passing  by  this  volume;  and  there,  always  as  
part  of  a  larger  argument  or  consideration.  
Given   these   facts,   we  must   reexamine   the   use   of   the   word   new   here.    
Perhaps  by  new,  one  might  in  turn  think,  the  authors  do  not  intend  to  signal  
a  temporal  change  in  phenomenological  inquiry,  but  a  thematic  one.    Maybe  
the   new   referred   to   in   the   title   indicates   some   shift,   conversion,  
transformation,   or   revolution   within   the   phenomenological   tradition.    
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Perhaps  the  authors  use  the  word  new  in  order  to  draw  the  reader’s  attention  
to   the   fact   that   many   of   the   inheritors   of   the   phenomenological   tradition  
have  challenged,  critiqued,  or  abandoned   it  entirely.      If   this   is   the  case,  we  
might   expect   Simmons   and   Benson’s   books   to   deal   those   thinkers   with   a  
liminal   relationship   to  phenomenology:   Jacques  Lacan,  perhaps;  or,  Michel  
Foucault   and   Gilles   Deleuze;   maybe   even   Jacques   Ranciere   and   Alain  
Badiou;   or,   stranger   still,   Francois   Laurelle,   Quentin  Meillassoux,   Graham  
Harman,   or   Ray   Brassier.      And   yet,   Simmons   and   Benson’s   new  
phenomenology  does  not  include  any  of  these  thinkers.  
So  what  exactly  are  we  to  make  of   the  new  phenomenology   to  which  we  
are   promised   a   philosophical   introduction   by   Simmons   and   Benson?    
Fortunately,   and  perhaps   sensing   the  possible   confusion   such  a   title  might  
inspire,   the   authors   waste   no   time   in   letting   the   reader   know   on   the   first  
page  of  their  volume  that:  
By [the] ‘new phenomenologists,’ we mean those French 
philosophers in the latter half of the twentieth century 
who all think in the wake of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) 
and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) – namely: Emmanuel 
Levinas (1906-95), Michel Henry (1922-2002), Jacques 
Derrida (1930-2004), Jean-Luc Marion (1946-), Jean-Louis 
Chretien (1952-), and to some extent, but in importantly 
different respects, Jean-Yves Lacoste (1953-), and Paul 
Ricoeur (1913-2005). (1) 
In  other  words,  the  new  phenomenology  referenced  in  the  title  to  this  volume  
indicates  those  thinkers  who  have  come,  by  and  large,  to  be  associated  with  
the  so-­‐‑called  “theological  turn”  in  European  philosophy.    In  this  regard,  the  
word   new,   as   used   by   Simmons   and   Benson,   expresses   both   a   temporal  
change  and  a  thematic  shift  since,  after  all,  these  new  phenomenologists  are  
both  contemporary,  and  in  many  cases  still  living,  and  moreover  aim  to  “‘go  
beyond’  historical  phenomenology  in  their  willingness  to  consider  God  and  
religious  experience”  (2).      
Given  its  subject  matter,  we  may  then  wonder  why  the  authors  did  not  
entitle  the  book  something  more  immediately  recognizable  and  direct.    Why  
not   call   it,   for   example,   “The   Theological   Turn   in   Phenomenology:   A  
Philosophical   Introduction”?      Such   a   title  would   have   certainly   forestalled  
the  kind  of  confusion  the  current  title  is  likely  to  inspire,  allowing  the  reader  
to   casually   and   immediately   understand   its   contents   and   place   it   quickly  
upon  his  or  her  shelves  next   to   their  copy  of  Dominique   Janicaud’s  critical  
introduction  to  the  movement,  Phenomenology  and  the   ‘Theological  Turn’:  The  
French  Debate   (New  York:  Fordham  University  Press,  2001),  or  perhaps  one  
or   two  of   John  Caputo’s  many  pieces  on  philosophy  and  theology.     Such  a  
quick   and   easy   appraisal   is   however   precisely   what   the   authors   of   this  
volume   hope   to   avoid.      For,   as   they   argue   eloquently   in   the   introduction,  
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such   an   understanding   is   fundamentally   flawed   and   has   contributed   to   a  
gross   injustice   in  how  these   thinkers  have   traditionally  been   treated  by   the  
philosophical  community.    It  is  the  aim  of  this  volume,  the  authors  declare,  
to   correct   such   misunderstandings   by   critically   rereading   the   relationship  
these   thinkers   have   to   one   another,   the   phenomenological   tradition   as   a  
whole,   and   a   few   of   the   key   questions   within   contemporary   philosophy,  
continental  and  analytic  alike.      
In   this   regard,   it   seems   that   the   kind   of   confusion   Simmons   and  
Benson’s  title  is  likely  to  inspire  is  not  only  entirely  intended,  it  may  even  be  
a  necessary  precondition  for  the  kind  of  new  reading  and  understanding  of  
the   phenomenological   tradition   the   authors   hope   to   inspire.     Without   the  
kind   of   cognitive   dissonance   such   a   title   inspires   when   coupled   with   the  
collection  of  thinkers  treated  therein,  the  reader  may  all  too  easily  rely  on  his  
or   her   complacent   understanding   of   the   scope   and   trajectory   of   these  
thinkers   as   vaguely   theological.      But,   according   to   Simmons   and   Benson,  
though  “all  [of  these  thinkers]  do  engage  in  significant  reflection  on  topics  of  
concern   to   philosophy   of   religion,”   their   work   should   “not   be   read   as  
exclusively,  or  even  as  primarily  engaged  in  a  theological  project,”  (2).    It  is  
therefore,  they  argue,  only  by  first  breaking  with  this  hermeneutic  prejudice  
that   these   thinkers  belong   to  a  “theological   turn”  happening   in  philosophy  
that   the   relevance   of   their   work   to   “a   wide   range   of   central   matters   for  
philosophical  inquiry  and  human  existence,”  can  be  properly  recognized  (2).    
It   is   the   aim   of   Simmons   and   Benson’s   book   to   shatter   this   traditional  
“theological”   reading   of   the   work   of   these   new   phenomenologists;   and   to  
forge   a   new,   properly   “philosophical,”   re-­‐‑introduction   to   them.      In   this  
regard,  The  New  Phenomenology  can  be  read  as  a  kind  of  critical  response  to  
Janicaud’s  piece.      Its  goal:   to   reframe   the  work  of   these  authors  within   the  
phenomenological   tradition   anew   in   order   to   draw   new   readers   to   their  
tomes  and  to  challenge  older  readers,  already  more  familiar  with  their  work,  
to  reconsider  their  relevance  to  some  of  the  major  thematic  questions  within  
the  history  of  philosophy.  
It   is  with   this   goal   in  mind   that   the   authors  draft   three   theses   around  
which   the   subsequent   chapters   of   their   volume   are   organized.      First,   the  
authors  claim  that  “new  phenomenology  can  be  legitimately  considered  an  
heir  to  historical  phenomenology,”  (7).    This  of  course  requires  showing  that  
a  continuity  exists  between  their  work  and  the  traditional  phenomenological  
projects   of   Husserl   and   Heidegger,   despite   any   thematic   derivations   or  
challenges  they  may  subsequently  introduce.    Second,  the  authors  claim  that  
“new   phenomenology   should   be   weighed   and   considered   in   light   of   a  
variety  of  contemporary  philosophical  problems,”  (8).    Finally,  Simmons  and  
Benson   assert   that   “new   phenomenology   can   be   productively   put   into  
conversation   with   other   contemporary   philosophical   perspectives,”   both  
analytic   and   continental   alike   (8).      The   organization   of   their   book   falls  
roughly  around  these  three  theses  with  the  first  two  chapters  focusing  on  the  
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first   of   these   theses   leaving   the   remaining   six   chapters   to   address   the   last  
two,  there  paying  particular  attention  to  how  “new  phenomenology”  relates  
to  Christian  philosophy,  analytic  philosophy  of  religion,  ethics,  and  politics.    
Only   when   read   in   light   of   these   theses   can   this   volume   be   understood  
properly  and  assessed  appropriately.  
The   first   of   Simmons   and   Benson’s   goals   is   accomplished   adequately  
enough,  albeit  rather  quickly,  in  the  first  few  chapters  of  this  volume.    There,  
the  authors  make  short  work  of  the  traditional  criticisms  the  thinkers  treated  
within  by  them  have  received  from  the  likes  of  Janicaud,  namely:  that  their  
work   breaks   with   the   phenomenological   tradition   qua   theological  
speculation.      In   response   to   this   criticism,   Simmons   and   Benson   solidly  
justify   a   re-­‐‑reading   of   these   thinkers   as   faithful,   though   perhaps   radical,  
participants   in   the   phenomenological   tradition.      While   this   task   is   an  
essential   step   for   this  volume,   and   it   is   skillfully   accomplished,   it   is  not   in  
these   first   few  chapters   that   the   real   strength  of   this  volume   is  on  display.    
The   real   strength   of   the   volume   lies   in  what   follows:  where   Simmons   and  
Benson   show   how   a   properly   phenomenological   reading   of   these   thinkers  
can  be  used  to  address  anew  key  questions  within  the  history  of  philosophy  
concerning  the  nature  of  God,  ontology,  acts  of  faith,  and  most  interestingly,  
ethics  and  politics.      
It   is   there,   in   the   final  chapters  of   the  volume,  where   the  authors   treat  
the  relation  of  the  thinkers  in  question  to  the  problem  of  normativity  and  the  
“possible  futures  for  new  phenomenology,”  that  the  intellectual  momentum  
of   Simmons   and   Benson’s   volume,   which   builds   steadily   from   chapter   to  
chapter,   finally   reaches   its   apex   and   proves   of   lasting   value   to   the   reader.    
And,   it   will   be   there,   if   nowhere   else,   that   even   the   most   reluctant   and  
suspicious  readers  will  be  forced  to  critically  reappraise  the  value  this  set  of  
thinkers   (generally   dismissed   as   agents   of   a   theological   agenda)   have   for  
those   concerned  with  key  questions  within   the  history  of  philosophy.      For  
me,  the  real  value  of  these  final  chapters  is  the  way  in  which  they  are  likely  
to  draw  new  readers   to  phenomenology,   especially   those  either  unfamiliar  
with   or   suspicious   of   the   continental   tradition   as   a   whole,   particularly  
analytic  ethicists  and  social  and  political  philosophers,  who  I  think  will  find  
in   these   pages   a   clear   means   of   relating   the   “new   phenomenologists”   to  
questions  he  or  she  may  be  more  familiar  with.    
For  these  reasons,  we  could  conclude  that  despite  the  fact  that  the  core  
content  of   this   book   consists   in   a   treatment  of   a   few  key   figures   in  French  
philosophy,   Simmons   and  Benson’s   book   is   not   really   aimed   at   readers   of  
this   journal.     This   is  not  to  say  that  those  trained  in  continental  philosophy  
or   phenomenology   couldn’t   benefit   from   reading   it.      To   the   contrary,  
Simmons   and   Benson’s   volume   will   prove   vitally   important   to   those  
interested   in   better   understanding   the   work   of   Levinas,   Henry,   Derrida,  
Marion,   and   Chretien   by   better   situating   their   work   within   the  
phenomenological  tradition.    Nevertheless,  the  reader  who  will  benefit  most  
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from  this  volume  is  someone  less  familiar  with  their  work,  either  because  he  
or   she   had   previously   dismissed   them   as   overly   theological,   or   by   dint   of  
their  unfamiliarity  with  the  continental  tradition  as  a  whole.    In  this  regard,  I  
see  this  volume  being  of  most  use  assigned  to  high  level  undergraduates  or  
first   year   graduate   students,   particularly   those   who   are   perhaps   vaguely  
aware   of   the   phenomenological   tradition,   but   otherwise   relatively  
uninformed   concerning   its   contemporary   developments,   trajectories,   and  
possible   applications.      Better   still,   I   can   see   the  value  of   this   volume  as   an  
interdepartmental  missive  –  something  passed  between  offices  from  those  of  
us  who  work   in   the  phenomenological   tradition   to   our   analytic   colleagues  
who  are   curious   just  what   it   is   that  we’re  up   to.     With  any   luck,  Simmons  
and   Benson’s   The   New   Phenomenology:   A   Philosophical   Introduction   might  
contribute   to   further   tearing   down   the   somewhat   arbitrary   walls   that  
separate  our   two  philosophical   traditions,   revealing  as   it  does  a  number  of  
points   of   overlap  between   the  kinds  of   questions  Levinas,  Henry,  Derrida,  
and  Chretien  raise  and  the  kinds  of  questions  driving  contemporary  analytic  
thought.  
 
